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Abstract: In a secure roaming scenario, a user U travels to a foreign network and
communicates with a foreign server V securely so that no one other than U and V can
obtain the messages exchanged between them. U may also want to travel anonymously
so that no one including V can find out its identity or trace its whereabouts except its
home server H . There have been many key establishment protocols proposed for secure
roaming. A typical application of these protocols is the mobile roaming service which
may be deployed to interconnected WLAN and 3G networks. Despite the importance
of these protocols, most of the protocols are analyzed heuristically. They are lack of
formal security treatment.
In this paper, we propose a formal key exchange definition and formalize secure roam-
ing under the Canetti-Krawczyk (CK) model. We also propose a formal model for
capturing the notions of user anonymity and untraceability. By using the modular ap-
proach supported by the CK-model, we construct an efficient key exchange protocol
for roaming and then extend it to support user anonymity and untraceability. The
protocols are efficient and each of them requires only four message flows among the
three parties U , H and V . For building our protocols, we construct a one-pass counter
based MT-authenticator and show its security under the assumption of a conventional
MAC secure against chosen message attack.
Key Words: Authenticated Key Exchange, Anonymous Roaming
Category: C.2.2, H.4.3
1 Introduction
Secure key exchange protocols provide the basis of building secure commu-
nications using symmetric key cryptography. In 1993, Bellare and Rogaway
[Bellare and Rogaway 1994] proposed the first formalized security model for
provably secure key exchange protocols under the symmetric key setting. Their
work was later extended to a three party case (in which the third party is
a key distributor) and the asymmetric setting in [Bellare and Rogaway 1995,
Blake-Wilson and Menezes 1997, Blake-Wilson et al. 1997]. In 1998, Bellare et
al. proposed a different model which treats authentication and key exchange sep-
arately [Bellare et al. 1998]. One of the major advantages of this model is that it
supports a modular approach to the construction of secure protocols. During the
construction, some proven secure building blocks are used. These building blocks
can also be reused for building other protocols. In 2001, Canetti and Krawczyk
[Canetti and Krawczyk 2001] followed the work and refined it further. They also
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changed the definition of secure key exchange from the original simulation-based
approach to an indistinguishability-based approach. In this paper, we call their
model as the CK-model.
1.1 Secure Roaming
A traditional key exchange protocol has two parties [Bellare and Rogaway 1994]
or three parties in a trusted third party setting [Bellare and Rogaway 1995].
With the rapid development of mobile technology, wireless networks have become
widely available. People can travel around with their mobile devices without be-
ing limited by the geographical coverage of their home networks. This capability
is called roaming. A typical roaming scenario involves three parties: a roaming
user U , a home server H , and a foreign server V . During roaming, U , which is
a legitimate subscriber of H , is now in a foreign network and wants to receive
services provided by V . In a typical mobile roaming scenario, a mobile user U
travels to a foreign network and gets access to V after being authenticated by V
that H is indeed the home server of U . The authentication is carried out with
the involvement of H . In addition to authentication, U and V also establish a
secure channel, by carrying out a key exchange protocol, so that no one except
U and V can obtain the messages exchanged between them. U may also want to
make sure that the party it is communicating with is indeed V . Hence foreign
server authentication may also need to be carried out between U and V . With
all these security requirements satisfied, we call this type of roaming activities
as secure roaming.
1.2 User Anonymity and Untraceability
Another important issue regarding the roaming scenario is user privacy. It con-
cerns about hiding the roaming user’s identity and movements from eavesdrop-
pers and even the foreign servers. Informally, user anonymity means that besides
U and H , no one including V can find out the identity of U , and user untrace-
ability means that besides U and H , no one including V is able to identify any
previous protocol runs which have U involved.
In cellular networks, GSM and 3GPP roaming protocols provide a certain
degree of anonymity by using some temporary identity called TMSI (Temporary
Mobile Subscriber Identity) rather than the real identity IMSI (International
Mobile Subscriber Identity) for each roaming user. However, different sessions
of the same user within one foreign domain can be easily linked by the foreign
server. Therefore, user untraceability requirement is not satisfied.
There are many other roaming applications that require user privacy, for
example, the inter-bank ATM networks and the credit card payment systems
[Ateniese et al. 1994]. Ideally, a user should not reveal anything to the serving
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network (i.e. the foreign server) other than the confirmation of the user’s good
standing with respect to the user’s ATM card or credit card issued by the user’s
home server. However, current systems are having users given out their personal
information inevitably. Some other scenarios which require anonymous roaming
include hopping across meshed WLANs (Wireless Local Area Networks) ad-
ministered by different individuals, joining and leaving various wireless ad hoc
networks operated by different foreign operators, etc. With the integration of
WLANs and 3G cellular networks, anonymous and secure roaming will become
more important in the near future.
1.3 Our Results
We consider a key exchange protocol for secure and anonymous roaming to be
a protocol involving three parties: a user and two servers, namely a home server
and a foreign server. In each successful protocol execution (i.e. all the parties
accept the protocol execution), the following five properties will be attained.
1. (Foreign Server Authentication) The user is sure about the identity of
the foreign server.
2. (Subscription Validation) The foreign server is sure about the identity of
the home server of the user.
3. (Key Establishment) The user and the foreign server establish a random
session key which is known only to them. In particular, the home server
should not obtain the key.
4. (User Anonymity) Besides the user himself and his home server, no one
including the foreign server can tell the identity of the user.
5. (User Untraceability) Besides the user himself and his home server, no
one including the foreign server is able to identify any previous protocol runs
which have the same user involved.
In subsequent sections, we first propose a key exchange definition and secure
roaming formalization under the CK-model [Canetti and Krawczyk 2001]. Our
definitions formalize the first three properties above. We then capture the last
two properties (user anonymity and untraceability) by proposing a general secu-
rity framework and introducing a security definition for them. We call a scheme
satisfying all these properties as an Anonymous and Authenticated Key
Exchange for Roaming (AAKE-R).
We focus ourselves on constructing an AAKE-R scheme for a typical roam-
ing scenario such that the user and the foreign server has a direct communi-
cation link and the foreign server and the home server has another direct link
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while the user and the home server do not have a direct link. Also the scheme
involves all the three parties. This setting is one of the most common roam-
ing scenarios in practice [Mouly and Pautet 1992, Mu and Varadharajan 1996,
Ateniese et al. 1994, Samfat et al. 1995, Buttyan et al. 2000, Go and Kim 2001,
Hwang and Chang 2003, 3GPP].
We adopt the approach of the CK-model [Canetti and Krawczyk 2001] and
construct a key exchange protocol for secure roaming that satisfies the first three
properties above. We then extend it to construct an AAKE-R protocol. The
protocols not only are provably secure but also efficient. In each of the protocols,
there are only four message flows and only standard cryptographic primitives
are used. Hence efficient implementation is possible by choosing appropriate
instantiations of the primitives to use. For building our protocols, we construct
a one-pass counter based MT-authenticator and show its security under the
assumption of having a MAC (Message Authentication Code) algorithm secure
against chosen message attack.
Finally, we also present an anonymous authenticated key exchange (AAKE)
protocol which is used by the mobile user to communicate with the home server
in the home domain. Our AAKE protocol is an abbreviation of the AAKE-R
protocol and it requires only two message flows.
1.4 Related Work
There have been many key establishment protocols proposed for secure roam-
ing [Mouly and Pautet 1992, Ateniese et al. 1994, Mu and Varadharajan 1996,
Samfat et al. 1995, Buttyan et al. 2000, Hwang and Chang 2003, 3GPP]. This
type of protocols may potentially be adopted widely in emerging applications
such as roaming over interconnected WLAN and 3G networks. Despite the im-
portance of these protocols, most of the protocols are analyzed heuristically and
lack of a formal security treatment. Also, there have been a number of work
on secure roaming with user anonymity and untraceability [Ateniese et al. 1994,
Samfat et al. 1995, Go and Kim 2001]. In [Samfat et al. 1995], there is a session
key established in each protocol execution between a user and a foreign server.
However, the key is also known to the user’s home server. This is undesirable
because when a roaming user is visiting a foreign server, services are actually
provided by the foreign server to the user but not the home server. The home
server is called in only as a guarantor for giving a promise that the user is indeed
a legitimate subscriber of the home server. For example, in the WLAN Roaming,
when a user accesses the Internet through a foreign server, the user may not want
his home server to know which network sites he is visiting. Beside this undesir-
able feature, in all the protocols of [Samfat et al. 1995], the key value remains
unchanged for all the sessions between the user and a particular foreign server.
This allows the foreign server to trace the user easily. In [Go and Kim 2001], a
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protocol was designed for protecting a roaming user’s identity from all entities
other than his home server and the serving foreign server. However, according to
results from [Wong 2005], a malicious server which is not communicating with
the roaming user can launch an active attack to reveal the user’s identity. In ad-
dition, it is recently found that both [Samfat et al. 1995] and [Go and Kim 2001]
cannot provide Subscription Validation as both of them are vulnerable to the
Deposit-Case Attack [Yang et al. 2005].
In the construction of our key exchange protocol for secure roaming un-
der the CK-model, we propose and use a counter based MT-authenticator.
Our counter based MT-authenticator is an improvement of the one proposed in
[Bellare et al. 1998]. The counter based MT-authenticator in [Bellare et al. 1998]
cannot be used in the bidirectional setting where both sides use the same shared
key but each side has two different counters (one for sending and the other for re-
ceiving messages), because it is vulnerable to the reflection attack. Our improved
counter based MT-authenticator removes this limitation.
Organization. In Sec. 2, we review the CK-model and introduce a new MT-
authenticator called the one-pass counter based MT-authenticator. In Sec. 3, we
propose a formal key exchange definition for secure roaming under the CK-model
and construct a key exchange protocol that satisfies the first three properties of
above. In Sec. 4, we propose a formal definition for user anonymity and un-
traceability. This is followed by the construction of an anonymous version of our
protocol. We also present an anonymous authenticated key exchange (AAKE)
protocol which is used by the mobile user to communicate with the home server
in the home domain in Sec. 5. Finally, we conclude the paper in Sec. 6.
2 The Modular Approach and A One-pass Counter Based
MT-authenticator
2.1 The CK-Model
In the Canetti-Krawczyk (CK) model [Canetti and Krawczyk 2001], there is a
system of n parties denoted by P1,...,Pn, which may carry out multiple concur-
rent executions of a message-driven protocol in an adversary controlled network.
In each protocol execution, the adversary activates the protocol in some of the
parties either by action requests which model invocations coming from other pro-
grams run by the parties or incoming messages which model messages coming
from the network.
A key exchange (KE) protocol π is a message-driven protocol. Each execution
of the KE protocol is modelled as a series of activations within two parties, Pi and
Pj . For example, when activating the protocol within Pi, the program running
in Pi will receive the identity of Pj (with whom the key is to be established), a
session ID s and a role which can be either initiator or responder. The program of
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Pi will then fork a sub-process and pass in (Pi, Pj , s, role) to the sub-process. The
sub-process will be responsible for handling that particular protocol execution.
The forked sub-process is called a KE-session with input (Pi, Pj , s, role). A KE-
session is completed when the corresponding sub-process returns with output
(Pi, Pj , s, κ) where κ is non-null. In this model, each program can fork multiple
sub-processes to handle multiple KE-sessions. If party Pi has a KE-session with
input (Pi, Pj , s, role) and party Pj has a KE-session with input (Pj , Pi, s′, role′),
and s = s′, then we say that the two KE-sessions are matching.
There are two adversarial models.
1. Unauthenticated-links adversarial model (UM). A UM adversary U
is a PPT Turing machine which controls all the communication links of
the system and schedules all protocol events including the initiation of pro-
tocol executions and message delivery. The UM adversary can perform any
actions such as injecting or modifying messages. In addition, U knows all
the local output of a party except the secret output, i.e. the session key of a
key exchange session. The adversary U is also given the following additional
capabilities by making some appropriate queries to the game simulator. We
focus on reviewing the model for KE protocols.
(a) corrupt party Pi: Upon corruption, U learns all the current internal infor-
mation of Pi and takes over Pi. Pi can no longer be activated and does
not generate further output.
(b) session-state reveal of a specific KE-session within party Pi: U learns all
the current state of the KE-session, but not the long-term key or the
state information of other KE-sessions of party Pi.
(c) session-key reveal of a completed KE-session within party Pi: U learns
the secret output (i.e. the session key) of the KE-session.
(d) session expiration of a completed KE-session within party Pi: The session
key of the KE-session will be erased. This query is for capturing the
property of perfect forward secrecy.
A KE-session with input (Pi, Pj , s, role) is called exposed if (1) U corrupts
Pi or Pj before s expires or (2) U performs session-state reveal or session-key
reveal on session s of Pi or Pj .
2. Authenticated-links adversarial model (AM). An AM adversary has
all the capabilities as a UM adversary but the AM adversary is not al-
lowed to inject or modify messages (except that the sender is corrupted or
if the message belongs to an exposed session). The adversary is restricted
to deliver messages faithfully, and the message is only to be delivered once
(i.e. all the messages the adversary received are in a set M of undelivered
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messages with format (m,Pi,Pj) where Pi and Pj are the sender and the
receiver, m is some message, and once m is delivered, it is removed from
M). However, the adversary can choose not to deliver a message.
For the rest of the paper, we denote an AM adversary by A, and a UM adversary
by U . Let AUTHπ,A be the global output (i.e. the output of the adversary and
all the parties in the system) of running π in AM and UNAUTHπ,U be that in
UM .
Definition 1. Let π and π′ be n-party message-driven protocols in AM and
UM , respectively. We say that π′ emulates π in UM if for any UM -adversary
U there exists an AM -adversary A such that AUTHπ,A and UNAUTHπ′,U are
computationally indistinguishable.
Since the authentication in AM is explicitly ensured, if π′ emulates π in UM ,
the authentication in UM is also ensured.
Definition 2 (Authenticator). An authenticator C is an algorithm such that
for any protocol π in AM , the protocol C(π) emulates π in UM .
2.2 The Modular Approach
The way to construct an authenticator is given in [Bellare et al. 1998], where
a layered approach is used. An authenticator Cλ can be constructed from an
MT-authenticator λ which emulates the basic message transmission protocol.
The basic idea is that whenever a party Pi wants to send or receive a message,
we emulate it using λ.
Theorem 3 ([Bellare et al. 1998]). Let λ be an MT-authenticator (i.e. λ em-
ulates message transmission in unauthenticated networks), and let Cλ be a com-
piler constructed based on λ as described above. Then Cλ is an authenticator.
With this powerful compiler on hand, we can first design a secure key ex-
change protocol in the authenticated link model where we do not need to consider
authentication. Then we can use the compiler to derive a new protocol which
supports authentication in the unauthenticated link model. In the next, we define
session key security by following the definition in [Canetti and Krawczyk 2001].
To define the session key security of a KE protocol, the capability of A is
extended by allowing it to perform a test-session query. At any time during the
game, A can issue a test-session query on a KE-session that is completed, unex-
pired and unexposed. Let κ be the corresponding session key. A coin b R← {0, 1}
is tossed by the game simulator after receiving a test-session query from A. If
b = 0, κ is returned to A; otherwise, a value chosen according to the distribution
of session keys is returned to A. A can still carry out regular activities on this
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test-session after issuing the query but is not allowed to expose the test-session.
However, the attacker is allowed to corrupt a partner to the test-session as soon
as the test-session (or its matching session) expires at that party. This captures
the perfect forward secrecy property of a KE protocol. At the end of its run, A
outputs a bit b′ (as its guess for b).
All the session specific internal state information is securely erased once a
KE-session is completed. It only leaves the value of the secret local output (the
session key) after completing the session.
Definition 4. A KE protocol π is SK-secure if the properties below hold.
1. If two uncorrupted parties complete matching sessions, then they both out-
put the same key;
2. The probability that the adversary guesses correctly the bit b′ (i.e., b′ = b)
is no more than 1/2 plus a negligible fraction in the security parameter.
The following theorem is very important for the modular approach.
Theorem 5 ([Canetti and Krawczyk 2001]). Let π be a SK-secure key ex-
change protocol in AM and let λ be an MT-authenticator. Then π′ = Cλ(π) is a
SK-secure key exchange protocol in UM .
In other words, from the compilation, protocol π′ not only achieves authen-
ticity, but also ‘inherits’ the session key security from π.
Remark. From the proof of Theorem 5, it is not difficult to see that different
MT-authenticators can be used for different message flows in π, and the result-
ing compiler, which is a combination of different MT-authenticators, is still an
authenticator. This important feature makes the modular approach much more
flexible and powerful.
MT-authenticators can be built from various cryptographic primitives. In
case public key cryptosystems are used, it is assumed that each party has its
private key and also knows the authentic public keys of other parties. Below is
a signature based MT-authenticator [Bellare et al. 1998] which allows party Pi
to send a message m to party Pj in an authenticated way.
Pi ← Pj : Nj
Pi → Pj : m, SIGPi(m, Nj , Pj)
Nj ∈R {0, 1}k is a random challenge (or nonce) and SIGPi is the signature
generation function of Pi, where k is a security parameter. The signature scheme
is assumed to be secure against chosen message attack [Goldwasser et al. 1988].
In the subsection below, we propose a new MT-authenticator.
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2.3 A One-Pass Counter Based MT-authenticator
We propose a new MT-authenticator. This MT-authenticator will be used in
constructing the key exchange protocols for secure roaming in the subsequent
sections of this paper. It helps simplify the authentication procedures and im-
prove the protocol efficiency.
Suppose a party Pi shares a random key κ with another party Pj . Each
of Pi and Pj initiates a counter starting with 0. Our one-pass counter based
MT-authenticator λCOUNT proceeds as follows.
– Whenever Pi wants to send a message m to Pj , Pi increases its local counter
COUNTPi by one, sends m, COUNTPi , MACκ(m, COUNTPi , Pj) to Pj ,
and adds a message “Pi sent m to Pj” to Pi’s local output.
– Upon receiving m, COUNTPi , MACκ(m, COUNTPi , Pj), Pj verifies that
the MAC is correct and COUNTPi > COUNTPj where COUNTPj is the
local counter of Pj . If all of the verifications succeed, Pj outputs “Pj received
m from Pi” and sets COUNTPj = COUNTPi .
Theorem 6. If MAC is secure against chosen message attack, λCOUNT is an
MT-authenticator.
Proof. Here we assume that for the two communicating parties, one of them
always has the role of initiator and the other always has the role of responder.
But the proof also applies to the case when the communication is in bidirectional
and both directions are using the same shared key but with two different counters
(one for send and one for receive) at each side.
Let U be a UM adversary interacts with λCOUNT . We define an AM adver-
sary A which simulates U as follows.
A runs U on a simulated interaction with a set of parties running λCOUNT .
First, A chooses and distributes the shared secret keys for the imitated parties.
Then A proceeds its simulation as follows.
1. When U activates an imitated party P̃i for sending a message m to imitated
party P̃j , A activates Pi in AM for sending m to Pj .
2. When some imitated party P̃j outputs “P̃j received m from P̃i”, A activates
party Pj in AM with incoming message m from Pi.
3. When U corrupts a party, A corrupts the same party in AM and hands the
corresponding information (from the simulated run) to U .
4. A outputs whatever U outputs.
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Let E denote the event that imitated party P̃j outputs “P̃j received m from P̃i”
where P̃i is uncorrupted and the message (m, Pi, Pj) is not currently in the set
M of undelivered messages. In other words, either Pi is not activated for sending
m to Pj , or Pj has already had the same output before. Since neither P̃i nor P̃j
is corrupted, E is also the event that either P̃i is not activated for sending m to
P̃j , or P̃j has already had the same output before.
If E never occurs, then AUTHMT,A and UNAUTHλ,U are equally dis-
tributed. It remains to show that E occurs only with negligible probability.
We prove it by contradiction. Assume E occurs with non-negligible proba-
bility, then we construct a forger F that breaks the MAC with non-negligible
probability.
The forger F has a MAC oracle OMAC that uses an unknown random key,
F can request OMAC on any message or any verification pair (m, σ). The task
of F is to produce a valid (m, σ) pair but m has not been queried to the oracle
before.
F starts by running U on a set of parties running λCOUNT . F chooses and
distribute shared keys between parties with one exception, F randomly chooses
one pair of users P̃i and P̃j , and whenever one party is required to produce or
verify an MAC for some value, F queries the oracle and hands the result to that
party. If U chooses to corrupt either P̃i or P̃j , F fails and aborts.
Note that running λCOUNT in this case is equivalent to a regular run. Assume
E occurs with probability υ(k), the probability it occurs between P̃i and P̃j is
then 2υ(k)n(n−1) since P̃i and P̃j are randomly chosen. Also note that when E occurs
between P̃i and P̃j , neither P̃i nor P̃j is corrupted.
In the case P̃i is not activated for sending m to P̃j , F outputs the MAC value
U delivered to P̃j in the last message as its forgery. On the other hand, if P̃j
has already had the same output before, then P̃j has received m from P̃i with a
counter, say COUNT old
P̃i
before. Now when P̃j accepts m the second time, then
P̃j must have accepted another incoming message from P̃i with the same m but
with a more updated counter value, say COUNT new
P̃i
such that COUNT new
P̃i
>
COUNT old
P̃i
. However, P̃i (F) has never queried with (m, COUNT newP̃i , P̃j) be-
cause each message from P̃i to P̃j is assumed to be different. Hence F outputs
the MAC value that U has delivered to P̃j in the last message as its forgery as
well. Thus F successfully produces a forgery with probability 2υ(k)n(n−1) . 
Remark 1. Since we are considering the simple message transfer protocol here,
we do not need to consider session-state reveal, session-key reveal or session expi-
ration queries. Also the adversary controls the activations of the parties, so the
counter values are also known to the adversary.
Remark 2. A delayed previous message will be rejected by the receiver after
a later sent message is accepted in UM , while the delayed message will still be
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accepted in AM , but it will not affect A on emulating U .
Remark 3. We do not consider the counter resynchronization problem that
may occur if the database of either party collapses. Depending on the nature of
different applications, different resynchronization mechanisms may be used, for
example, if this MT-authenticator is used in telecommunication protocols, we
may build an additional resynchronization protocol to solve the problem.
2.4 SK-secure Key Exchange Protocols in AM
Now we consider another building block of the modular approach: SK-secure
key exchange protocols in AM . According to [Canetti and Krawczyk 2001], the
classical Diffie-Hellman key-exchange protocol is SK-secure under the Decisional
Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption [Boneh 1998]. Denote G a subgroup of prime
order q of a multiplicative group Z∗p and g a generator of G. Below is the review
of the protocol. Pi and Pj are two parties and s is the session ID.
Diffie-Hellman (DH) Key Exchange in AM :
1. On input (Pi, Pj , s), Pi chooses x ∈R Zq and sends (Pi, s, α = gx) to Pj .
2. Upon receipt of (Pi, s, α), Pj chooses y ∈R Zq and sends (Pj , s, β = gy) to
Pi, then computes κ = αy, erases y, and outputs the session key κ under
session ID s.
3. Upon receipt of (Pj , s, β), Pi computes κ′ = βx, erases x, and outputs the
session key κ′ under session ID s.
Theorem 7 ([Canetti and Krawczyk 2001]). Under the Decisional Diffie-
Hellman (DDH) assumption, Diffie-Hellman (DH) Key Exchange above is SK-
secure in AM .
3 Authenticated Key Exchange for Roaming (AKE-R)
We now propose a formal key exchange definition for secure roaming under the
CK-model. The definition will capture the first three properties for secure roam-
ing listed in Sec. 1.3: Foreign Server Authentication, Subscription Validation,
and Key Establishment. We then design a key exchange protocol for satisfying
the definition.
Let k be a system-wide security parameter. Let C(k) = {C1, · · · , CQ1(k)} be
the set of roaming users (clients) in the system and S(k) = {S1, · · · , SQ2(k)} be
the set of servers in the system, where Q1 and Q2 are some polynomials and
Ci, Sj are the corresponding identities of the parties, for 1 ≤ i ≤ Q1(k) and
1 ≤ j ≤ Q2(k).
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Subscription. The term ‘subscribe’ is commonly used to describe some spe-
cial relationship between a user and a server without clear definition. Based on
the widely-used concept of subscription in mobile communications, we give the
following definition for subscription.
Definition 8 (Subscribe). Given a security parameter k, ‘subscribe’ is a com-
putable function Subscribe from C(k) into S(k). We say that CA is ‘subscribed’
to SH if Subscribe(CA) = SH where CA ∈ C(k) and SH ∈ S(k).
We assume that each user has subscribed to one and only one server, and the
subscription is persistent. Hence scenarios related to changing subscriptions of
users are excluded.
Based on the terminologies of mobile communications, SH is said to be the
home server of CA and SV is said to be a foreign server of CA if SV = SH . We also
assume that the inverse Subscribe−1 is computable. Hence for any SH ∈ S(k),
Subscribe−1(SH) is the set of all CA ∈ C(k) such that Subscribe(CA) = SH .
3.1 The Security Definition of AKE-R
An AKE-R (Authenticated Key Exchange for Roaming) protocol is a message-
driven protocol. In the CK-model, each session is modelled by running a sub-
process within a party with input (Pi, Pj , P, s, role). We extend the CK-model
so that the parties are categorized as roaming users and servers. For a user
CA, the input of his session will be in the form (CA, SV , SH , s, initiator) where
the role must be initiator. For a server, the role can either be responder or
voucher. We say that three sessions of a user and two servers, CA, SV and SH ,
respectively, are 3-party matching, if in an execution of the AKE-R protocol,
user CA has a session with input (CA, SV , SH , s, initiator), server SV has a ses-
sion with input (SV , CA, SH , s′, responder), server SH has a session with input
(SH , CA, SV , s′′, voucher), where SH = SV , s = s′ = s′′ and Subscribe(CA) =
SH .
Definition 9 (SK-Secure AKE-R Protocol). An AKE-R protocol π runs
among CA, SV , and SH is called SK-secure if the following properties hold.
1. If uncorrupted CA, SV and SH complete 3-party matching sessions, then
upon the completion of the protocol, CA and SV output the same key.
2. The probability that anyone except CA and SV guesses correctly the bit b′
(i.e., b′ = b) in a test-session query (see Def. 4) is no more than 1/2 plus a
negligible fraction in the security parameter.
Having an AKE-R protocol SK-secure is not enough in practice. In particular,
the definition does not capture Subscription Validation. For example, suppose we
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extend the two-party Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol which is proven SK-
secure in AM (reviewed in Sec. 2.4) to a three-party version in such a way that
CA and SV conduct the key exchange. After completed, SV sends the session ID
to SH . Then SH accepts and the protocol is completed. This three-party version
can be shown to be SK-secure with respect to Def. 9 but obviously not satisfying
the requirement of Subscription Validation.
For Subscription Validation, SV has to make sure that a statement issued
by a server has been received claiming that CA is subscribed to the server and
is connecting to SV . In addition, CA has to make sure that SV has received a
statement issued by SH .
Definition 10 (Secure AKE-R Protocol). An AKE-R protocol π run among
CA, SV , and SH is secure if the following properties hold.
1. π is a SK-secure AKE-R protocol.
2. Upon the completion of the 3-party matching sessions,
(a) the matching session of SH has sent the message below to SV ;
CA is subscribed to SH and is talking to SV
(b) the matching session of SV has received the message below from SH ;
CA is subscribed to SH and is talking to SV
(c) the matching session of SV has sent the message below to CA;
SH claimed that CA is its subscriber and is talking to SV
(d) the matching session of CA has received the message below from SV .
SH claimed that CA is its subscriber and is talking to SV
We can see that the first three security goals in Sec. 1.3 are captured by
Def. 10. Foreign Server Authentication is captured by items (c) and (d). Sub-
scription Validation is captured by items (a), (b), (c), and (d), we should note
that if a server SH outputs the message no matter the actual home server of CA
is SH or not, then it relies on CA to check (item (d) above) if SH is cheating,
this helps detect the Deposit-Case Attack [Yang et al. 2005]. Key Establishment
is captured by the SK-security.
In the following, we state an important theorem which allows us to reuse
all the proven MT-authenticators given in Sec. 2 for constructing secure AKE-R
protocols.
Theorem 11. Let Cλ be an authenticator (Def. 2) constructed from an MT-
authenticator λ exemplified in Sec. 2. If π is a secure AKE-R protocol in AM ,
then π′ = Cλ(π) is a secure AKE-R protocol in UM .
Proof. We prove it by showing that the following requirements are satisfied.
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1. If π is SK-Secure, then π′ is also SK-Secure:
The proof follows that of Theorem 6 in [Canetti and Krawczyk 2001] di-
rectly. Since that proof only requires π′ emulates π, which is done due to the
definition of Cλ, and also it does not depend on the parties involved in the
protocol. Therefore, if π is SK-Secure, π′ = Cλ(π) “inherits” this property
from π.
2. If π satisfies requirement 2 of Def. 10 in AM , π′ satisfies the requirement in
UM as well:
Suppose π′ does not satisfy this requirement. Then there exists an adversary
U in UM such that the global output of running π′ with U does not follow the
requirement, but there is no adversary in AM can do this since π satisfies the
requirement. Thus the global outputs are distinguishable, in contradiction
to Cλ being an authenticator. 
We now start describing our AKE-R protocol. Our protocol consists of two steps.
In the first step, a user carries out a Pre-authentication protocol with his home
server when he is in the network operated by his home server. In this step, a
‘long-term’ user authentication key will be established. This key will be used in
the second step for authenticating the user.
In the second step, the user is roaming and communicating with a foreign
server. The roaming key exchange protocol will be carried out by the user, the
foreign server and the home server. The purpose of the protocol is to let the
roaming user and the foreign server establish a fresh session key so that a secure
channel can be built.
3.2 Pre-Authentication
The purpose of pre-authentication is to have CA and SH establish a user au-
thentication key, authKA. One way to achieve the task is to run a SK-secure
key exchange protocol. Alternatively, like in the cellular networks, the key has
already been embedded in the SIM card. No matter in which of these two cases,
we assume that authKA is randomly chosen and only shared by CA and SH .
After running the pre-authentication protocol, CA stores authKA and a
counter initialized to 0 in some secure and non-volatile memory location. SH
creates an entry for CA in its own database. In the entry for CA, attributes such
as the identity of CA, authKA and a counter value are included. The counter
is also initialized to 0, and will be increased in each run of the AKE-R Main
protocol below.
3.3 The AKE-R Main Protocol
We first describe our AKE-R Main Protocol in AM . Then we compile it to a
secure AKE-R protocol in UM using those authenticators described in Sec. 2.3.
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3.3.1 A Secure AKE-R Protocol in AM
We extend the two-party DH key exchange protocol which is SK-secure in AM
(Sec. 2.4) to a three-party variant. Since the network is controlled by the adver-
sary, here we use a virtual link between A and H although they are not physically
linked in our target applications.
Extended DH Protocol in AM : (Fig. 1)
1. A roaming user CA initiates the protocol execution by choosing x ∈R Zq and
sends (CA, SH , SV , s, α = gx) to SH .
2. Upon receipt of (CA, SH , SV , s, α), SH checks if CA is its subscriber, if not,
it rejects and halts. Otherwise, SH sends (CA, SH , SV , s, α) to SV .
3. Upon receipt of (CA, SH , SV , s, α), SV checks if SH is a legitimate server in
its server list, if not, it rejects and halts. Otherwise, SV chooses y ∈R Zq,
sends (CA, SV , SH , s, β = gy) to CA, then computes κ = αy, erases y, and
outputs the session key κ under session ID s.
4. Upon receipt of (CA, SH , SV , s, β), CA checks if SV is the correct server
it wants to communicate with and SH is indeed its home server. If either
verification fails, it rejects and halts. Otherwise, it computes κ′ = βx, erases
x, and outputs the session key κ′ under session ID s.
CA SH SV
m1 = (CA, SH , SV , s, α = g
x) m2 = (CA, SH , SV , s, α) 
m3 = (CA, SH , SV , s, β = g
y)
Figure 1: Protocol 1 – Extended DH protocol in AM
Corollary 12. Under the DDH assumption, the Extended DH protocol is a se-
cure AKE-R in AM .
According to Def. 10, the proof should contain two parts. The proof for the
first part, i.e., SK-security, is straightforward by following Theorem 7. The sec-
ond condition of Def. 10 is achieved by checking the identities in each message.
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CA SH SV
m1, COUNTA, MACauthKA (m1, COUNTA)
NV
m2, SIGSH (m2, NV ) 
NA 
m3, SIGSV (m3, NA)
m1 = (CA, SH , SV , s, α = g
x) m2 = (CA, SH , SV , s, α) m3 = (CA, SH , SV , s, β = g
y)
Figure 2: Protocol 2 – Extended DH protocol in UM
3.3.2 A Secure AKE-R Protocol in UM
An AKE-R protocol in UM can be derived by applying MT-authenticators to
the Extended DH protocol in AM . We apply the one-pass counter based MT-
authenticator to m1, the signature based MT-authenticator to m2 and m3. The
resulting protocol is in Fig. 2.
After deriving the AKE-R protocol in UM , an optimization [Tin et al. 2003]
of message flows can be applied. And the final AKE-R protocol in UM is illus-
trated in Fig. 3.
CA SV SH
m1, COUNTA, MACauthKA (m1, COUNTA),
NA  m1, COUNTA, MACauthKA (m1, COUNTA),
NV 
m2, SIGSH (m2, NV )
m3, SIGSV (m3, NA)
m1 = (CA, SH , SV , s, α = g
x) m2 = (CA, SH , SV , s, α) m3 = (CA, SH , SV , s, β = g
y)
Figure 3: Protocol 3 – Optimized Extended DH protocol in UM
We can see that Protocol 3 preserves the same message flows as Protocol 1,
if we treat SV as a router. And Protocol 3 uses the same MT-authenticator for
each authentication step as Protocol 2 does, therefore, Protocol 3 maintains the
security of Protocol 2.
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4 Anonymous and Authenticated Key Exchange for Roaming
(AAKE-R)
We now start specifying the security definition of the anonymous version of an
AKE-R protocol. This version of AKE-R protocol will satisfy all the five proper-
ties listed in Sec. 1.3. In particular, the protocol should provide User Anonymity
and User Untraceability. We call such a protocol an Anonymous and Authenti-
cated Key Exchange for Roaming (AAKE-R) protocol.
4.1 The Security Definition of User Anonymity and Untraceability
Game A: “The game is carried out by a simulator S which runs an adversary U .
It is based on the adversarial model UM .
1. S sets up a system with users in C(k) and servers in S(k).
2. S then runs U and answers U ’s queries.
3. U can execute the AAKE-R protocol on any parties in the system by acti-
vating these parties and making queries.
4. Among all the parties in the system, U picks two users Ci, Cj ∈ C(k) and
two servers SV , SH ∈ S(k) such that Subscribe(Ci) = Subscribe(Cj) = SH .
5. U sends a test query by providing Ci, Cj , SV and SH .
6. The simulator S simulates one AAKE-R protocol run among Ci, SV and SH ,
and another one among Cj , SV and SH . S also updates the state information
of each party due to the simulation. Then S tosses a coin b, b R← {0, 1}. If
b = 0, the simulation transcript with Ci is returned to U , otherwise, that
with Cj is returned to U . Denote T the transcript U receives, and sid the
session ID in T.
7. After receiving the response of the test query, U can still launch all the allow-
able attacks through queries and also activate parties for protocol executions
as before.
8. At the end of U ’s run, it outputs a bit b′ (as its guess for b).”
U wins the game if (1) SH , Ci and Cj are uncorrupted, (2) for the session sid
in step 6 above, U can only perform session-state reveal, session-key reveal and
session expiration queries to SV . (3) U guesses correctly the bit b (i.e. outputs
b′ = b.). Define Advπ,U(k) = Pr[U wins the game]− 1/2.
Definition 13 (User Anonymity and Untraceability). An AKE-R proto-
col provides user anonymity and untraceability, if for sufficiently large security
parameter k, Advπ,U (k) is negligible.
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The formulation of Def. 13 is very powerful and can be shown to ensure both
user anonymity and user untraceability required by a good AAKE-R protocol.
It guarantees that as long as the home server is uncorrupted, the adversary can
neither tell the identity from the messages of one session nor link that session to
another one.
4.2 A Secure AAKE-R Protocol
Based on the secure AKE-R protocol (in UM) proposed in Sec. 3, we now modify
it so that it also provides user anonymity and untraceability.
To provide user anonymity, the identity of the user should not be sent in
clear. In addition, it should not be known to the foreign server according to the
anonymity definition above. To do so, we first change the identities in m1, m2
and m3 as follows:
m1 = alias, CA, SH , SV , s, gx
m2 = alias, SH, SV , s, gx
m3 = alias, SH, SV , s, gy
Here alias acts as a temporary ID for the roaming user which is a fixed-length
binary string chosen randomly from {0, 1}k. Also, encrypt the first message of
the protocol using SH ’s public key.
In addition, for anonymity, all the counters used in the system should have the
same length. We define a counter COUNT ∈ {0, 1}Q3(k) for some polynomial
Q3 and assume that the value of COUNT would not reach 2Q3(k) − 1 in the
lifetime of the system.
The complete AAKE-R main protocol is illustrated in Fig. 4.
CA as alias SV SH
SH , NA
c1 ← ESH (m1, COUNTA, MACauthKA (m1, COUNTA)) 
c1, NV 
m2, SIGSH (m2, NV )
m3, SIGSV (m3, NA)
m1 = (alias, CA, SH , SV , s, g
x) m2 = (alias, SH , SV , s, g
x) m3 = (alias, SH , SV , s, β = g
y)
Figure 4: The AAKE-R Main Protocol
Theorem 14. If ESH is CCA-secure, Advπ,U(k) is negligible.
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Proof. We prove it by contradiction. Namely, if the protocol is not anonymous,
that is, if U wins the game with non-negligible advantage, υ(k), over random
guess (which is half chance), we construct a distinguisher D to break ESH .
We start by describing a game for the distinguisher D. First, D adaptively
queries a decryption oracle with any ciphertext. Then D chooses two messages
msg0 and msg1 and asks the game simulator for a ciphertext. The simulator
randomly picks b R← {0, 1} and givesD the ciphertext c such that c = ESH (msgb).
After receiving c, D adaptively queries the decryption oracle with any ciphertext
except c. D is to output a value b′ ∈ {0, 1} as its guess for b.
Now we construct D which simulates Game A. First, D sets up the system
appropriately by creating a set C(k) of users and another set S(k) of servers. It
then initializes all the users in C(k) with randomly chosen authentication keys
from {0, 1}k and counters which are with initial value 0, and initializes all the
servers in S(k) with randomly chosen public key pairs for encryption and another
set of public key pairs for signature. Afterwards, D randomly picks a server, SH ,
and replace its encryption public key such that it corresponds to ESH .
D runs U and answers all its queries and simulates all the responses of party
activation due to protocol execution. If U picks SH as the home server, two users
Ci, Cj such that Subscribe(Ci) = Subscribe(Cj) = SH , and some server SV as
the foreign server during the test query, D answers the query by providing the
transcript of a protocol run constructed as follows.
First, D randomly chooses x in Zq, alias in {0, 1}k, a session ID s in {0, 1}k,
and constructs two messages msg0 and msg1 as follows.
msg0 = alias|| Ci|| SH || SV || s || gx|| COUNTi + 1|| MACi
msg1 = alias|| Cj || SH || SV || s || gx|| COUNTj + 1|| MACj
D queries the CCA-security simulator with msg0 and msg1. Suppose the CCA-
security simulator returns a ciphertext c. Then, D constructs
message1 = 〈 SH , NA, c 〉
message2 = 〈 c, NV 〉
message3 = 〈 alias, SH, SV , s, gx, SIGSH (alias, SH , SV , s, gx, NV ) 〉
message4 = 〈 alias, SH, SV , s, gy, SIGSV (alias, SH, SV , s, gy, NA) 〉.
where NA, NV ∈R {0, 1}k. D also updates the counter values in the internal
states of Ci, Cj and SH .
The transcript returned by D to U , as the response for U ’s test query, is
(message1, message2, message3, message4). D continues the game by answering
all the queries made by U and simulating all the responses of party activation
due to protocol execution. If U asks a session-state reveal query to SV with
session ID s, the simulator S returns the random coins in generating NV , gy and
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SIGSV (alias, SH , SV , s, gy, NA) to U . If U corrupts SV , S returns the long-term
keys of SV , and the internal state of SV which includes the state information of
session s, to U .
When U outputs a bit value b′ as its guess, D outputs b′ and halts.
If U does not pick SH as the home server in his test query, D just randomly
picks a value b′ R← {0, 1}, outputs it and halts.
Analysis: Let E be the event that U picks SH as the home server in its test
query. Since D chooses SH from S(k) in the game uniformly at random, Pr[E] =
1
Q2(k)
. Hence we have
Pr[D guesses b correctly] = (1
2
+ υ(k))Pr[E] +
1
2
(1− Pr[E])
=
1
2
+
υ(k)
Q2(k)
which is non-negligible over random guess. 
5 Communications in the Home Domain
In this section, we present an anonymous authenticated key exchange (AAKE)
protocol which is used for the mobile user to communicate with the home server
in the home domain. Note that in Sec. 4, we consider anonymity and untrace-
ability against the foreign server, which is an insider of the protocol, but in this
section, we only need to consider anonymity and untraceability against outsiders.
The protocol is presented in Fig. 5.
CA as alias SH
ESH (alias, CA, s, g
x, COUNTA, MACauthKA (alias, CA, s, g
x, COUNTA, SH ))

SH , s, g
y , SIGSH (alias, SH , s, g
y , gx)
Figure 5: Anonymous Authenticated Key Exchange in the Home Domain
It is easy to see that the AAKE protocol is an abbreviation of the AAKE-R
protocol and gx in the first message also plays the role of a nonce in the signature
based MT-authenticator. The security proof for this protocol follows that of the
AAKE-R protocol in a straightforward way and is omitted here.
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6 Conclusion
Based on the modular approach of the CK-model, we build an anonymous and
authenticated key exchange protocol for roaming (AAKE-R) which is provably
secure and efficient. The performance of a roaming protocol is mainly deter-
mined by its communication rounds, our AAKE-R protocol, which requires only
four rounds among the three communicating parties, has the optimal round
efficiency compared with existing roaming protocols in the literature. As a side-
product from our modular construction, we propose a one-pass counter based
MT-authenticator and show its security under the assumption that there ex-
ists an MAC function which is secure against chosen message attack. Like other
proven secure MT-authenticators, this new MT-authenticator can also be reused
to construct new protocols in the future.
Throughout the construction of our AAKE-R scheme, we introduced a formal
definition for secure roaming under the CK-model, and proposed a definition for
user anonymity and untraceability. We hope that the framework and definitions
can be further studied and adopted for analyzing new protocols of this kind in
the future.
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